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Abstract 
This article surveys some recent changes and developments in the field of science and theology. 
Older accounts like that of Ian Barbour, which mapped the field in terms of different kinds of 
relationship between ‘science’ and ‘religion’ (or ‘theology’), have been criticized in recent years 
for giving an over-simplified and misleading impression of the complex and varied encounters 
between particular scientific and theological discourses. In place of Barbour’s schema, I propose 
a more nuanced way of thinking about how particular theological enquiries might engage with 
relevant scientific disciplines. One important debate in science and theology, concerning divine 
action in the natural world, is used to illustrate the proposed approach. The use of this example 
reveals how new paths have opened up in recent years in this particular debate, in addition to 
new possibilities for understanding the field as a whole. 
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Introduction 
In recent years, the study of science and theology has undergone some important changes and 
developments. As a result, new possibilities have emerged for thinking about the relationship of 
theology with the natural sciences in creative and interesting ways. In this article I shall explore 
some of these new possibilities, with particular reference to debates about divine action in the 
natural world.1 
Typologies and their problems 
One way to understand how the field has changed in recent years is to begin with one of its 
twentieth century pioneers, Ian Barbour. Among his major contributions was a famous 
classification or typology of possible relationships between science and religion. He identified 
four ways of understanding the relationship: conflict, independence, dialogue or integration.2 
Examples of conflict would be atheists such as Richard Dawkins, who claim that science 
 
1 The argument of this article is developed more fully in Neil Messer, Science in Theology: Encounters Between 
Science and the Christian Tradition (London: Bloomsbury T & T Clark, forthcoming). 
2 E.g. Ian G. Barbour, When Science Meets Religion (San Francisco, CA: HarperSanFrancisco, 2000). 
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discredits religious faith,3 and believers who reject certain scientific theories on religious 
grounds, such as young-earth creationists. Independence was exemplified by the paleontologist 
Stephen Jay Gould, who regarded science and religion as ‘non-overlapping magisteria’: each has 
authority in its own domain, but neither should encroach on the other’s territory. In dialogue, 
science and religion might relate constructively to each other while retaining some measure of 
independence from each other, while integration suggests a closer relationship between the 
two. Dialogue and integration were the approaches identified with most scholars in the field of 
science and religion/theology,4 and Barbour himself favoured integration.5 
Barbour’s typology has had a great influence on the ways scholars have understood the field of 
science and theology, on the kinds of questions that have been asked and how they were 
answered. Following Barbour, various other scholars have proposed their own variations or 
improvements on his typology.6 However, in recent years, Barbour’s typology and others like it 
have been increasingly criticized. One basic problem is that these typologies suggest two 
independent entities, one called ‘science’ and the other called ‘theology’ (or ‘religion’), which 
may then relate to each other in various ways: they might get into a fight, ignore one another, 
have a conversation, or attempt to join themselves together. However, this is a misleading 
image in various ways. Historically, the use of the English words ‘science,’ ‘theology’ and 
‘religion’ to represent these independent entities or activities is remarkably recent. As Peter 
Harrison has argued, it would simply not have made sense to a mediaeval or early modern 
scholar to talk about how ‘science’ and ‘religion’ (or their Latin roots, scientia and religio) are 
related to each other.7 This suggests, for example, that it may be very misleading to think of 
Galileo’s conflict with the Catholic hierarchy as a conflict between ‘science’ and ‘religion.’  
A related problem, of course, is that the English terms used by Barbour and his successors 
might not have exact equivalents in other languages. As is well known, for example, the English 
word ‘science’ has a much narrower meaning than the German Wissenschaft, but probably 
broader than more specific German terms like Naturwissenschaft. 
 
3 See Richard Dawkins, The God Delusion (London: Black Swan, 2007). 
4 The field is sometimes referred to as ‘science and religion,’ and sometimes as ‘science and theology.’ While these 
two titles suggest different emphases, and some scholars prefer one or the other, in practice they largely refer to 
the same area of academic activity. My own interest is in the relationship of Christian theology to the natural (and 
human) sciences. 
5 Ian G. Barbour, Nature, Human Nature, and God (London: SPCK, 2002), p. 2. 
6 E.g. Ted Peters, ‘Theology and the Natural Sciences,’ in David F. Ford (ed.), The Modern Theologians, (2nd ed., 
Oxford: Blackwell, 1997), pp. 649-67; John Polkinghorne, Science and the Trinity: The Christian Encounter with 
Reality (London: SPCK, 2004), pp. 11-32; Mikael Stenmark, ‘Ways of Relating Science and Religion,’ in Peter 
Harrison (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Science and Religion (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 
pp. 278-95. 
7 See Peter Harrison, The Territories of Science and Religion (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2015). 
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A further criticism of typologies like Barbour’s is that they treat science, religion and theology as 
essentialist categories.8 They imply that there is a unified category called ‘science’ (for example) 
with a fixed, stable meaning, so that all examples of ‘scientific’ activity, wherever they are 
found, will share the same essential characteristics. Not only is this historically inaccurate, as 
we have seen: it also hardly does justice to the diversity of present-day scientific activity. 
Particle physics, organic chemistry, evolutionary palaeobiology, molecular genetics and 
cognitive neuroscience are very different activities with highly diverse methods and 
approaches. For this reason, it might be over-simplified and misleading to say that when divine 
action is discussed in relation to quantum physics, when we think about theodicy in the light of 
evolutionary biology, and when neuroscience raises questions for theological ethics, these are 
all instances of the same thing: the relationship between ‘science’ and ‘theology.’ Perhaps, as 
John Perry and Sarah Lane Ritchie suggest, one should instead focus on whether, and how, 
particular areas of theological enquiry should engage with particular scientific findings or 
disciplines.9  
Science in theology: a conversation between two voices 
In the light of these various criticisms, it might be better to speak of ‘science in theology.’ This 
would mean asking a different question from Barbour’s. Our question would be: What can 
scientific insights contribute to theological understanding? Or to put it another way: What 
should theologians be willing to learn (and what should they not be willing to learn) from the 
sciences? Following Perry and Ritchie’s lead, rather than asking this question about science and 
theology as a whole, we can consider it as a question to be asked about particular areas of 
theological enquiry and the particular scientific fields that might contribute to them.10 
One can imagine this as a conversation between different voices. If we are seeking an answer to 
a theological question, or trying to understand some aspect of the world or human life in 
relation to God, various voices will have things to say about that question or topic. One could 
be called ‘the voice of the Christian tradition’: this is a voice rooted in the Scriptures and shaped 
by the Church’s history of reading and reflection on those Scriptures down the centuries. But a 
particular scientific discipline might also have something to say. The question then becomes: 
 
8 E.g. Geoffrey Cantor and Chris Kenny, ‘Barbour’s Fourfold Way: Problems with his Taxonomy of Science-Religion 
Relationships,’ Zygon 36.4 (2001), pp. 765-81. For a response, see Ian G. Barbour, ‘On Typologies for Relating 
Science and Religion,’ Zygon 37.2 (2002), pp. 345-59. 
9 John Perry and Sarah Lane Ritchie, ‘Magnets, Magic, and Other Anomalies: In Defense of Methodological 
Naturalism,’ Zygon 53.4 (2018), pp. 1064-93. 
10 Of course, one could also ask the reverse question: what can theological insights contribute to particular areas of 
scientific understanding? In this article, I am considering the science and theology field as a theological sub-
discipline, and therefore emphasising what the sciences can contribute to theological understanding. However, it is 
entirely possible that dialogues of the kind described here could also offer new insights to scientists who are open 
to them. 
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How much, and what kind of thing, should each of these voices contribute to our understanding 
of our theological topic?11 
An illustration: the question of divine action 
We can illustrate this approach by examining a particular topic, which has at times dominated 
the science and theology field, and continues to be an important area of debate. This is the 
question of divine action: whether, in the light of modern science, is it still possible to speak of 
God acting in the world, and if so, how. 
If we wish to answer that question, what contribution to our answer might come from the voice 
of the Christian tradition, and what might a voice from modern physics offer? One possibility is 
that one voice completely excludes the other. Some physicists might claim that our scientific 
understanding of the universe demonstrates that there is no God who acts in the world.12 
Alternatively one might say, borrowing Stephen Jay Gould’s terminology, that the question of 
divine action is a theological question, which is not part of the ‘magisterium’ of science. If so, 
scientific voices will have nothing to contribute to a theological understanding of divine action. 
Both of these extreme positions effectively close down any dialogue between scientific and 
Christian voices, privileging one voice to the exclusion of the other. However, in between these 
extremes are various possibilities for dialogue between the two voices. 
The Divine Action Project (DAP) 
During the late 1980s and 1990s, the question of divine action was the focus of intensive study 
and discussion in a series of conferences and edited volumes, jointly sponsored by the Vatican 
Observatory and the Center for Theology and the Natural Sciences in Berkeley, California. This 
research programme is usually referred to as the Divine Action Project (DAP).13 It has played a 
major role in shaping not only the divine action debate, but also the science and theology field 
as a whole. Some of the most influential proposals for thinking about divine action in the light 
of modern science were either generated, or refined and developed, through the conferences 
and discussions of the DAP. 
One view widely supported by DAP participants was that God acts through non-deterministic 
quantum mechanical processes. The classical physics of Newton and his successors was 
deterministic: every event in the world, such as a collision between two objects, will have an 
effect that can be predicted exactly if one knows the relevant physical laws and the starting 
 
11 Of course, there may be more than one scientific discipline or ‘voice’ with something to say. There may also be 
other voices, such as philosophical ones, with contributions to make to our topic. But to keep things simple, I am 
imagining this encounter simply as a conversation between two voices. 
12 For example, Victor J. Stenger, God: The Failed Hypothesis – How Science Shows that God Does Not Exist 
(Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 2007). 
13 See Wesley J. Wildman, ‘The Divine Action Project, 1988-2003,’ Theology and Science 2.1 (2004), pp. 31-75. 
Details of the books and summaries of the papers collected in them are available online at 
http://www.ctns.org/books.html (accessed 09 August 2019). 
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conditions (the mass of the objects, the velocities with which they are moving, etc.). This 
understanding of physics lends itself to a mechanistic view of the universe:14 the cosmos 
operates like a vastly complex clockwork mechanism, in which every event has a clearly defined 
physical cause. If this is the case, it seems that divine action is not needed to explain events in 
the physical world. Moreover, if every event is completely determined by physical causes, it 
seems that God could not act without interrupting or suspending the physical laws which, 
presumably, God also established; so divine action in the world might seem to involve God in 
self-contradiction. This mechanistic view of the universe might seem to have room only for the 
God of deism, who created the cosmos and left it to run according to its physical laws. 
However, this view changed radically around the beginning of the twentieth century, when it 
was discovered that the ‘microscopic’ world of atoms and sub-atomic particles does not behave 
in the same mechanistic way as the ‘macroscopic’ world of everyday objects. The behaviour of 
atoms and sub-atomic particles cannot be predicted with certainty by the application of 
deterministic physical laws, but only described in terms of probabilities. For example, one can 
say that 50% of the atomic nuclei in a sample of radioactive material will decay in a certain 
time, but it is impossible to predict when a single nucleus will decay. Quantum mechanics is the 
name given to the probabilistic, apparently non-deterministic physics of the microscopic 
world.15 To many science and theology scholars, quantum mechanics has offered new 
possibilities for conceiving of divine action: God could act by determining the outcome of 
otherwise non-determined quantum events.16 Such divine action at the microscopic level could 
influence events in the macroscopic world in various ways: for example, the radioactive decay 
of an atomic nucleus could cause a genetic mutation in an organism’s DNA, which could 
influence the evolutionary history of that species. 
Not all DAP participants were persuaded that quantum mechanics offers scope for speaking of 
divine action. John Polkinghorne, for example, looked instead to chaos theory.17 This is an area 
of physics that uses Newtonian laws to describe systems in which the course of events is 
extremely sensitive to the starting conditions. This means that the tiniest variation in the 
behaviour of any part of the system can have a very large effect, which makes the behaviour of 
chaotic systems effectively impossible to predict in a precise way. Many physical systems 
 
14 Newton himself, however, did not hold such a view: see Christopher Kaiser, Creation and the History of Science 
(London: Marshall Pickering, 1991), pp. 178-87, 191-95. 
15 Not everyone agrees that quantum mechanics is non-deterministic: some interpretations of it claim that the 
apparently random behaviour of atoms and sub-atomic particles is in fact fully determined by physical laws that 
we do not yet understand. 
16 For one example of this view, see Robert John Russell, ‘Quantum Theory and the Theology of Non-
Interventionist Objective Divine Action,’ in Philip Clayton (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Religion and Science 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), pp. 579-95. 
17 E.g. John Polkinghorne, ‘The Metaphysics of Divine Action,’ in Robert John Russell, Nancey Murphy and Arthur 
Peacocke (eds.), Chaos and Complexity: Scientific Perspectives on Divine Action (2nd ed., Vatican City: Vatican 
Observatory/Berkeley, CA: Center for Theology and the Natural Sciences, 1997), pp. 147-56. 
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exhibit chaotic behaviour, and Polkinghorne has frequently argued that it is possible to think of 
God acting to influence the behaviour of chaotic systems.  
Many of Polkinghorne’s DAP colleagues were skeptical about this claim. Some, such as Arthur 
Peacocke, preferred to think of God exercising what is sometimes called ‘top-down causation’ 
or ‘whole-part constraint’. The idea here is that will of God acts as a constraint on the whole 
cosmos, which has the effect of influencing particular outcomes without God having to 
intervene directly in those events. 
These three proposals by no means represent the whole range of views in the DAP. For all its 
diversity, however, there was a broad consensus about the ways in which the divine action 
debate should be structured and approached: (1) Most of the discussion was about ‘special 
divine action’ – particular providential acts of God in the world – rather than the ‘general divine 
action’ of creating and sustaining the cosmos. This was because contemporary science was 
thought to present more of a challenge to the former. (2) The consensus was that divine action 
must be ‘non-interventionist’: God must act without over-riding or interrupting the laws of 
nature. (3) Many (though not all) participants were ‘incompatibilists’: they thought that an 
event could not be the result of special divine action if it was completely determined by 
physical causes. This meant that much of the effort in the DAP was devoted to identifying gaps 
in the causal structure of nature, which would allow room for divine action.18 Some participants 
discerned such gaps in quantum mechanics, others in the physics of chaos. (4) Finally, one of 
the DAP’s most important commitments was to allow ‘maximum traction’ between science and 
theology, to use Philip Clayton’s expression.19 In practice, as Sarah Lane Ritchie observes, this 
meant that ‘it is science that finally determines where and how divine action could possibly 
occur … in the natural world.’20  
The DAP did represent a genuine conversation between the two voices that I identified earlier: 
the voices of the Christian tradition and a scientific discipline. However, if Ritchie’s description 
 
18 This does not mean that the DAP promoted a ‘God of the gaps’ strategy, proposing divine action as the 
explanation for anything that science cannot (yet) explain. Dietrich Bonhoeffer was one early critic of this strategy, 
pointing out that the God of the gaps will be more and more excluded from the world as the gaps in our scientific 
understanding are filled: see Letters and Papers from Prison (Eberhard Bethge (ed.); Reginald Fuller et al. (trans.), 
3rd ed., London: SCM Press, 1971), p. 311. A claim about ‘ontological gaps,’ on the other hand, refers to the causal 
structure of nature itself: for example, by saying that quantum events really are not completely determined by 
physical cause and effect. If there are ontological gaps of this sort in nature, they will not be filled by advances in 
scientific knowledge. 
19 Philip Clayton, Adventures in the Spirit: New Forays in Philosophical Theology (Zachary Simpson (ed.), 
Minneapolis, MN: Fortress, 2008), pp. 54f. 
20 Sarah Lane Ritchie, ‘An Elephant in the Room: Why the Causal Joint is Still Worth Talking About,’ in Gillian Straine 
(ed.), Are There Limits to Science? (Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2017), pp. 40-60 (p. 52). 
See also Sarah Lane Ritchie, ‘Dancing Around the Causal Joint: Challenging the Theological Turn in Divine Action 
Theories,’ Zygon 52.2 (2017), pp. 361-79. 
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is correct, it was the scientific voice which dominated the conversation. It was mainly this voice 
that set the agenda and determined what could and could not be said.  
This made it possible for DAP participants to challenge one another’s proposals about divine 
action on apparently scientific grounds. It also laid the whole project open to more 
comprehensive scientific challenges. For example, Nicholas Saunders has examined most of the 
main DAP proposals (particularly those based on quantum physics and chaos theory) and 
rejected them on scientific grounds. He has concluded that ‘the prospects for supporting 
anything like the “traditional understanding” of God’s activity in the world are extremely bleak 
… it is no real exaggeration to state that contemporary theology is in crisis.’21  
The ‘theological turn’ 
Partly in response to such problems, various authors from different theological traditions have 
begun to approach the question of divine action in different ways from the DAP. One example 
is the Orthodox theologian Christopher Knight, who draws on the theology of Maximos the 
Confessor to develop what he calls a ‘neo-Byzantine’ account of divine action.22 This account is 
‘panentheist’: it envisages the whole of creation as in some sense ‘in God,’ though not identical 
to God. It is also ‘sacramental’: all created things are oriented towards God’s purposes, and this 
orientation is made particularly ‘transparent’ in the sacraments, in which created things like 
water, bread and wine disclose God’s purposes for creation especially clearly. To give an 
account of how God acts in such a world, Knight uses Maximos’ distinction between the Logos 
(Word) and the logoi (words). The Logos is the reason and wisdom of God, at work in all 
creation since the beginning, which became flesh in Jesus Christ. But all created things have 
their own characteristic logoi, implanted in them by God, which makes them what they are and 
manifests God’s creative purposes for them. According to Knight, this view dissolves the 
distinction between general and special divine action, because God is always at work in the 
world through the logoi. Knight thinks even miracles can be understood in terms of this 
account. Miracles are not occasions when God interrupts the laws of nature, but the operation 
of ‘laws’ that are not scientifically discoverable, through which created things become more 
fully natural: that is, they fulfil God’s creative purposes for them more fully. 
A contrasting account comes from the Pentecostal theologian Amos Yong, whose account of 
divine action is pneumatological and eschatological.23 In Jesus’ life, death and resurrection the 
Holy Spirit was at work, offering a sign and foretaste of God’s coming kingdom. The coming of 
the kingdom will involve a transformation of created reality through the work of the Spirit, in 
 
21 Nicholas Saunders, Divine Action and Modern Science (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), p. 215, 
emphasis original. For a response to Saunders, see Wildman, ‘The Divine Action Project,’ pp. 47-50, 55-57. 
22 Christopher C. Knight, The God of Nature: Incarnation and Contemporary Science (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress, 
2007). 
23 Amos Yong, The Spirit of Creation: Modern Science and Divine Action in the Pentecostal-Charismatic Imagination 
(Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2011). 
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ways that cannot be predicted by natural science. Divine actions in the present age, like God’s 
acts in the life, death and resurrection of Jesus, can be seen as signs and ‘anticipations of the 
world to come.’24 
Ritchie argues that for all their differences, what accounts like Knight’s and Yong’s have in 
common is that they give priority to theological, not scientific, categories in forming an 
understanding of divine action. She and others have referred to this shift towards theological 
categories as a ‘theological turn’ in the divine action debate.25 If that is correct, it suggests 
another possibility for the conversation between our two voices. The voice of the Christian 
tradition and the voice of the relevant scientific discipline are again in a genuine dialogue, but 
now it is the voice of the Christian tradition which plays the dominant role in setting the agenda 
and shaping the conversation. 
Middle paths in the divine action debate 
Ritchie’s account of the divine action debate, then, suggests that it has tended to follow one of 
two possibilities: either a scientific voice dominates (as in the DAP) or the voice of the Christian 
tradition plays the dominant role (as in the theological turn). However, things may not be quite 
that simple. For one thing, as I noted earlier, the DAP was quite diverse in its participants, and 
not all of them accepted the majority positions. For example, the Catholic scholar William 
Stoeger drew on Thomas Aquinas’ distinction between ‘primary’ and ‘secondary’ causes.26 
‘Primary’ refers to God, who is the Creator of all things and the ultimate cause of everything. 
‘Secondary’ refers to causation within the created world, including the kinds of cause and effect 
that the natural sciences can study. With this distinction, it is possible to speak of something in 
the natural world being caused both by God (as its primary cause) and by the natural, 
secondary causes through which God operates. This enabled Stoeger to challenge or revise 
some of the key assumptions of the DAP.27 His stated aim was to ‘take seriously both revelation 
and the knowledge of reality we have from the sciences … letting these two areas of our 
knowledge critically interact and dialogue with each other.’28  
From the other side, some of the accounts that Ritchie identifies with the theological turn have 
more continuity with the DAP than they might appear to. Both Knight and Yong, for example, 
acknowledge their debts to it, even though they move beyond it in their own accounts. By his 
own account, Yong ‘seek[s] to be constrained by the sciences in recognizing the limits of what 
can be said about divine action within the framework of modern science,’ as well as 
 
24 Yong, The Spirit of Creation, p. 93. 
25 Ritchie, ‘An Elephant in the Room,’ p. 52. 
26 William R. Stoeger, ‘Describing God’s Action in the World in Light of Scientific Knowledge of Reality,’ in Russell et 
al., Chaos and Complexity, pp. 239-61; Denis Edwards, How God Acts: Creation, Redemption, and Special Divine 
Action (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress, 2010). 
27 William R. Stoeger, ‘The Divine Action Project: Reflections on the Compatibilism/Incompatibilism Divide,’ 
Theology and Science 2.2 (2004), pp. 192-96. 
28 Stoeger, ‘Describing God’s Action in the World,’ p. 261. 
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‘suggest[ing] how theological perspectives invite reconsideration of … notions that have been 
by and large excluded from contemporary scientific discussion.’29 
Some voices from both the DAP and the theological turn, in short, seem to be advocating a 
third possibility for the dialogue: one in which both scientific and Christian voices participate, 
but neither dominates. Instead both voices play more nearly equal roles in framing the dialogue 
and guiding the conclusions. Whether or not this interpretation is correct, Ritchie herself seems 
to advocate such a middle way. She is critical of the DAP for giving scientific perspectives a 
strong power of veto over theological claims. On the other hand, she also criticizes theological-
turn authors for neglecting the question of how ‘the transcendent, immaterial God’ interacts 
with the material world; she wants to retain some ‘traction’ between science and theology.30  
Conclusion: science in theology – new paths and possibilities 
Earlier, I suggested that instead of asking how ‘science’ and ‘theology’ should relate to one 
another, it would be better to ask what we should be ready to learn from relevant scientific 
disciplines when conducting particular theological enquiries. I proposed the image of a 
conversation between two voices, the voice of the Christian tradition and the voice of the 
relevant scientific discipline.  
By surveying one particular theological enquiry – how to understand divine action in the world 
– we have discovered a range of possibilities for the encounter between those two voices. At 
one extreme, the voice of the Christian tradition is excluded, perhaps by a kind of materialism 
according to which science shows that there is no God. Along the scale from this extreme is a 
position which allows genuine dialogue between the two voices, albeit one in which the 
scientific voice dominates. Next is the possibility of a middle position in which neither voice 
dominates the conversation. Further along is a type of conversation in which the voice of the 
Christian tradition plays the dominant role in the theological enquiry. At the other extreme, 
only the voice of the Christian tradition is allowed any role, and scientific voices are thought to 
have nothing to offer.  
Some of these options are more attractive than others, though none is entirely without 
problems. Elsewhere, in relation to a different theological enquiry, I have argued that the two 
extremes should generally be rejected, while the second type of encounter, in which the 
scientific voice dominates, has serious drawbacks. The third and fourth types are more 
promising, but each is at risk of drifting towards one of the more problematic positions; so each 
of these two types of engagement may be needed to challenge and correct the other.31 
Imagining the encounter in this way, as a conversation between two voices, has generated a 
new kind of typology of science-theology encounters. This typology is different from older ones 
 
29 Yong, The Spirit of Creation, p. 73. 
30 Ritchie, ‘Dancing Around the Causal Joint,’ p. 377. 
31 Neil Messer, ‘Evolution and Theodicy: How (Not) to do Science and Theology’, Zygon 53.3: (2018), pp. 821-35. 
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such as Barbour’s, and avoids some of their problems. I believe it can help us understand 
encounters of theology with the natural sciences more clearly, and can offer guidance to those 
setting up such encounters. 
This is an exciting time for the field of science and theology, in which various new paths are 
opening up. Some of these represent new options for particular debates and areas of enquiry. 
For example, in the divine action debate, we have seen how the ‘theological turn’ and the 
discussion it has provoked have opened up new possibilities that were not so apparent in the 
days of the Divine Action Project. There are also new ways to understand the science and 
theology field itself, which could enable a broader and richer range of creative possibilities for 
theological encounters with the natural sciences. 
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